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 Abstract 
 
Interactive technology is a key factor used to explain the recent growth and prominence of NGOs, 
who today are engaged in the transformation of national, international and transnational political 
space. Yet technology cannot explain NGOs’ rise, for technology is but a context which afford 
opportunities. We ask what it is that allows NGOs to take advantage of new circumstances, and 
focus our discussion on the co-evolution of NGOs with interactive technology. Our approach is 
part of a growing body of social science research that seeks to overcome the artificial divide 
between “society” and “technology” by viewing the social as consisting of humans and non-
humans (objects, things, artifacts). Viewing technology not as a tool but as part of a co-
evolutionary process that shapes organizational forms and practices will help us understand why 
NGOs have, given the opportunities provided by the retrenchment of the welfare state and the end 
of the cold war, been able to assume a more powerful and controversial role as co-constituents of 
global transformation. 
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We are witnesses to an epochal transformation in the analytically distinct domains of production 
and communication.  On one side, we see a shift from mass production to network modes of 
organizing, as hierarchical, bureaucratic forms coexist with  heterarchical, collaborative forms.  
On the other, we see a shift from mass communication to interactive media, as the uni-directional 
channels of one-to-many coexist with the hypertextual world of increasing interactivity. The dual 
shifts are, in fact, a twinned transformation: from mass production/mass communication to 
network production/network communication.  To understand the new organizational forms of our 
epoch we must study how their roles and practices co-evolve with the new interactive 
technologies. 
 
These transformations are being exponentially accelerated by digital tools that make it possible to 
access text, audio, visual, and data base information in an encompassing, interactive environment.   
Actors now participate in complex digital ecologies consisting of the Internet, intranets, extranets, 
websites, virtual collaborative workplaces, and the like.  Within this encompassing environment 
of extended connectivity and near-ubiquitous computing, the new media do not simply allow 
organizations to communicate faster or to perform existing functions more effectively, they also 
present opportunities to communicate in entirely new ways and to perform radically new 
functions.  Especially because these are interactive media, their adoption becomes an occasion for 
innovation that restructure interdependencies, reshape interfaces, and transform relations.  
 
The impact of such developments are as far-reaching for international order as for individual 
organizations. Among the many actors of this rapidly changing environment, non-governmental 
organizations have exploded in number and visibility as the 20th century neared its end. Today 
NGOs are engaged, directly or at the margins, in the transformation of national, international and 
transnational political space. NGOs appear in various, often conflicting, guises: as building 
blocks for a global civic culture, incubators for new international institutions, barefoot 
revolutionaries carrying out globalization from below, or new missionaries imposing Western 
ideals from above. Interactive technology is generally regarded as instrumental support for one or 
the other of these guises. Technology is appended to a constellation of factors that are used to 
explain the recent growth and prominence of NGOs, most notably the retrenchment of the welfare 
state, the end of the cold war (with its dual legacy of democratization and new civil wars) and a 
rise in private donations.1 
 
But none of these factors can explain NGOs’ rise, rather they are all contexts which afford 
opportunities. The question is begged, therefore, why NGOs have been able to take advantage of 
these circumstances. This paper suggests that the answer lies in examining the co-evolution of 
NGOs with interactive technology. Our approach is part of a growing body of social science 
research that seeks to overcome the artificial divide between “society” and “technology” by 
viewing the social as consisting of humans and non-humans (objects, things, artifacts).2 Viewing 
                                                     
1 See for example Marc Lindenberg and Coralie Bryant, Going Global, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 
2001, pp. 8-12. 
2 This approach draws on the work of French sociologists Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, and other 
social scientists in the United States who have been working with similar concepts.  Hutchins, for example, 
argues that cognition is distributed across a network of persons and instruments.  Suchman’s pathbreaking 
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technology not as a tool but as part of a co-evolutionary process that shapes organizational forms 
and practices will help us understand why NGOs have, given the opportunities provided by the 
retrenchment of the welfare state and the end of the cold war, been able to assume a more 
powerful and controversial role as co-constituents of global transformation. 
 
 
2. knowledge spaces. 
 
What is it about interactive technology, particularly its most widespread instantiation in the 
Internet, that makes it resonate deeply in so many registers across the globe? If pressed to explain 
the essence the Internet in three words we would choose link, search and interact. This is 
certainly not the first technology to enable each of these functions: using a telephone you can 
search  by dialing the operator to get “information” and can then use the same phone to link you 
with a party with whom you interact. Now consider the popular search engine Google: when it 
suggests sites to match your query it is also performing a search and establishing a link. But to 
prioritize your answer it considers all the other sites who have linked to the potentially relevant 
sites that match your query and ranks them based on patterns of links (i.e. the site with the highest 
number of links to them is considered more relevant). In other words it searches based on the 
pattern of links. For the telephone the process of link, search and interact is merely additive.3 For 
Google they are multiplicative and recombinatory: each of these processes forms the basis for the 
other. 
 
This recombinant technology allows search not only on the pattern of links, but also on the 
pattern of interactions. If you are even a casual user of Amazon.com the web site will suggest 
titles to you based on a book or CD you are looking at. This is done not by matching terms in the 
title or abstract of the book, which would entail a high degree of potentially humorous error, but 
by tracking patterns of purchase and preferences and then using an algorithm to determine that 
“people who bought this book also bought….”4 The output of Google or Amazon, of course, is 
web sites or books, while the output of the telephone is interaction with a person. What if you 
could harness the properties of the web’s recombinatory logic to suggest interaction with people?  
 
Consider why this might be desirable: At a practical level, the glut of information available on the 
web is such that even if you know what you are looking for, you need a way to find the most 
relevant information expeditiously. Since the creators of all this content are people, not machines, 
it stands to reason that asking the right person might be the best way to find the information you 
are looking for. Researchers have developed such “word of mouth” software, (one is 
appropriately named “gab,” as in talk, but also for Group Asynchronous Browsing).5 But there is 
an even more compelling reason to prefer a recombinatory over an additive approach—when you 
                                                                                                                                                              
work on human-machine interaction similarly resonates with the work of Callon and Latour and provides 
the basis for further studies on distributed design. See Michel Callon, The Laws of the markets,  Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1998; Bruno Latour, “Technology is Society Made Durable,” in John Law, ed., A 
Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology, and Domination,  Routledge, 1991, pp. 103-131; 
Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the wild, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995; and Lucy Suchman, Plans and 
situated actions : the problem of human-machine communication, New York : Cambridge University Press, 
1987. 
3 Which is not to downplay linking by itself—after all, we do have a very real use for the one-to-one 
technology of the telephone. 
4 This form of search is known as collaborative filtering. For a good general introduction see Malcom 
Gladwell, The Science of the Sleeper, The New Yorker, . 
5 See Kent Wittenburg et al., Group Asynchronous Browsing on the World Wide Web, 
http://www.w3.org/Conferences/WWW4/Papers/98/.  
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don’t know what you are looking for but would know it when you find it (e.g. what happens 
every night at a singles bar). Unlike finding a phone number from “information,” this way you 
find things you didn’t know and come into contact with people whom you don’t know. Now, you 
probably would balk at interacting directly with other customers of Amazon, but there are 
communities where this would be quite an asset. For example, a doctor who wants to know who 
else is treating patients for similar rare diseases or, trapped in your cubicle, you would love to 
know whether and where there might be persons with knowledge or skills relevant to your work, 
or qualities that match your romantic desires. Or if you are part of an NGO community and you 
want to share best practices. 
 
Using the patterns of search or interact, one can link social structures (who knows who) and 
knowledge networks (who knows what). Amazon.com’s collaborative filtering software is a 
commercial variant of similar programs such as the aptly-named Yenta, Beehive, or the browser 
Alexa.6 For members of an NGO or non-profit community this could help develop and promote 
their respective knowledge networks. Working with a group of 285 such organizations in the 
Midwest, researchers at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champagne developed a software 
program that could help the organizations identify those in the community who shared common 
or complementary interests and show how they may be directly or indirectly connected.7 This 
software, based on a tool called IKNOW, is distinctive because the users can find out not only 
“who knows who” and “who knows what,” but also “who knows who knows who,” and “who 
knows who knows what.”8 This works by capturing network data of both knowledge networks 
(based on links between actor’s web sites, on common links from their web sites to third party 
sites, on similarity in content between different web sites, and on an inventory of skills and 
expertise provided by the actors) and communication networks (based on an inventory of existing 
task and project links between them).9 
 
From social structures and knowledge networks we thus get at cognitive social structures and 
cognitive knowledge networks (who knows whom or what). The cognitive perceptions of the 
members of a knowledge community taken individually may be incomplete or inaccurate, but 
together they form a transactive memory system that shares domains of knowledge.10 This hints at 
a larger significance for what at first might seem at first like just a good way to sell books: 
communities of knowledge can not only be identified, but also created.  IKNOW does not just 
enable dyadic relationships in the manner of personal ads, but also facilitates communities of 
knowledge. 
 
                                                     
6See, respectively, http://foner.www.media.mit.edu/people/foner/Yenta/; http://info.alexa.com/; 
ftp://parcftp.xerox.com/pub/dynamics/beehive.html.  
7 PrairieNet communityware can be seen at http://www.tec.spcomm.uiuc.edu/nosh/prairienet. 
8 IKNOW stands for Inquiring Knowledge Networks On the Web. See Noshir Contractor, David Zink and 
Michael Chan, “IKNOW: A tool to assist and study the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of 
knowledge networks” In Toru Ishida (Ed.), Community Computing and Support Systems, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science 1519(pp. 201-217). Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1998. The IKNOW web site is: 
http://www.tec.spcomm.uiuc.edu/nosh/IKNOW.  
9 Contractor et al., 10. 
10 Contractor, Ibid. See also Noshir Contractor, “Social Network Formulations of Knowledge and 
Distributed Intelligence: Using Computational Models to Extend and Integrate Theories of Transactive 
Memory and Public Goods.” Paper presented at Santa Fe Institute Workshop on  "Heterarchies: Distributed 
Intelligence and the Organization of Diversity," 2000. 
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The development of new knowledge communities is part of the changing concept of “public.”11 
We have already come to expect different re-presentation because of the web: digital photos of 
our grandchildren, company web sites that afford certain functions, the availability of news in 
interactive forms, art designed for a digital environment. As we adapt to new situations we hardly 
notice how our expectations and practices shift, but step back a moment and consider this digital 
artist’s perspective: “All the strategies developed to awaken audiences from a dream-existence of 
bourgeois society, like constructivist design, new typography, avant-garde cinematography and 
film editing, as well as photo-montage, now define the basic routines of post-industrial society; 
that is, the interaction with a computer.”12 That these basic routines may in fact lull audiences 
back into a dream-like state rather than awaken them is less the point than discerning how the use 
of interactive technology has created a space that is dynamic, interactive, multi-dimensional and 
representational.13  
 
This space—let us borrow Lévy’s term “knowledge space”—is dissimilar to the established 
means of communication because it integrates discursive and non-discursive elements.14 This is 
as much a space within which something happens, as it is a space for something to happen.15 As a 
space within which something happens we can trace empirically the circulation and creation of 
knowledge communities. As a space for something to happen we can speculate that new forms of 
social organization, including new social bonds, will develop on the basis of a relation to 
knowledge (for example, by the re-locating of ties in social structures such as the family or the 
workplace, the valorization of programming skills and the mobility of electronic labor, and so 
forth).16 Such a transformation does not imply that knowledge is a function of interactive 
technology, any more than exchange is a function of capitalism. But just as exchange acquired 
specific characteristics under capitalism that became the basis for a complex system, so does 
knowledge acquire new characteristics in our (infelicitously but popularly titled) information age. 
 
 
3. towards a new spatio-temporal order? 
 
The knowledge space is part of the oft-described network paradigm that is displacing central-
planning and strictly hierarchical thinking.17 Networks operate more fluidly and can improve on 
accounts of complex social interaction over the methodological individualism of positivist social 
science. They have the significant effect of enhancing flows and creating a shared acceleration 
that corresponds to the compressed space-time of our late modern era. This spatio-temporal 
compression is part and parcel of the function of interactive technologies, which combine real-
time and many-to-many communication in ways that fundamentally re-arrange the ways firms 
produce, states fight wars, and peoples lives are structured. This re-arranging is, significantly, a 
                                                     
11 This also alters the related concept of audience from one based on categories and demographics to a 
network conception, with far-reaching implications for marketing. See Manville 2001 and Stark (ASA 
paper). 
12 Interview with Lev Manovitch in New Media Culture in Europe:  Art, Research, Innovation, 
Participation, Public Domain, Learning, Education, Policy.  Edited. by Frank Boyd, Cathy Brickwood, 
Andreas Broeckmann et al.  Amsterdam:  Uitgeverij de Balie and the Virtual Platform, 1997. 
13 Pierre Lévy uses these characteristics to explain his notion of “cosmopedia.” See Pierre Lévy, Collective 
Intelligence, Cambridge MA: Perseus Books, 1997, p.216. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See Steven Johnson, Interface Culture: How new technology transforms the way we create and 
communicate, San Fransisco: HarperEdge, 1997. 
16 Levy’s take on the social bond in Collective Intelligence  can be found on pp. 10-13 and part one 
(“Engineering the Social Bond”). 
17 See especially Manuel Castells, The Network Society, London: Blackwell, 1999. 
5 
form of de-territorialization, both because the electronic space in which power and action is being 
reconstituted is literally not located in territorial space, and because the institutions that evolved 
to regulate life within territorial borders are ill-suited to the tasks of regulating transborder 
flows.18 
 
Deterritorialization is the process at the core of the unbundling of the nation-state. It forces a 
transformation of the spatial organization of politics away from the single-point perspective that 
Ruggie pegs as the defining doctrinal characteristic of sovereignty.19 Most of us will have little 
difficulty agreeing minimally that an increase in flows of money, people and commodities has 
challenged the ability of the nation-state to exert its social ordering functions, that global issues 
exist beyond the control of any one state, and that, consequently, the global political system is 
undergoing a significant transformation. But few will agree on what this is a transformation to. 
 
We would be charlatans if we claimed to know what the new spatial organization of politics will 
be. We can, however, identify elements of the transformation, in particular three shifts (these are 
ongoing shifts, not completed processes): 
 
- First, there is a shift among states and intergovernmental organizations from a concern 
about the sanctity of sovereignty to a concern about the enforcement of universal norms. 
This can be viewed cynically or hopefully, through the lens of empire or enlightenment. 
Certainly not all governments embrace such a shift (ironically the United States is 
foremost among the obstructionists while also one of the greatest proselytizers of 
universal principles), but a global agenda that prioritizes humanitarian, environmental, 
and even economic justice issues has established itself as a dominant discourse. 
 
- Second, there is a shift from decentralized to distributed structures. Decentralized 
governing structures emerged to (over)compensate for the inability of centralized forms 
of government and market to efficiently provide the resources or results deemed 
necessary for the good life, resulting in privatization or political structures such as 
subsidiarity and devolution. Decentralized production enabled capital to increase its 
mobility. But decentralization is an effect. Distribution, on the other hand, is the capacity 
for a collective actor whose capacity to be strategic is an emergent effect of the patterns 
of association and cannot be assigned to a single person alone, or even to a network of 
humans.20 
 
- Third, in the analytical methodology that informs (social) scientific development we see a 
shift from what Latour called a diffusion model to a model of translation.21 The diffusion 
                                                     
18 Saskia Sassen elaborates the concept of electronic space in chapter 9 of Saskia Sassen, Globalization and 
its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money, New York: New Press, 1998. On the 
perforation of territorial borders see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the 
World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. For a mind-blowing grappling with an 
expanded sense of deterritorialization see Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. 
19 John Ruggie, “Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations,” 
International Organization 47:1, Winter 1993, p.159. 
20 See Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild; Suchman, Plans and Situated Actions. See also  John Law and John 
Hassard, eds., Actor Network Theory and After, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999; and Monique Girard 
and David Stark, “Distributing Intelligence and Organizing Diversity in New Media Projects” Environment 
and Planning, forthcoming. 
21 Bruno Latour, “Powers of Association,” in John Law, ed., Power, Action, and Belief: A New Sociology of 
Knowledge.  Routledge:1986, pp. 264-280. The following account is drawn from pp. 266-69. 
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model is a model of inertia and friction, where changes are explained by theorizing about 
what retards or accelerates an order or object’s trajectory—for example, the idea of the 
nation-state as a stable, given combination of traits and territory whose trajectory can be 
explained by a mixture of hard times that slow down its progress (perhaps covetous 
neighbors who invades their territory) or good times that speed it up (such as economic 
boom, or the nation-state’s own military conquests).22 The nation is merely transmitted 
from one generation to the next with a rich history of (and potential for future) friction. A 
translation model dispenses with inertia and sees an object or order as being continuously 
transformed by the actors themselves who engage in continuous reinterpretation.23 In 
more fashionable terms a translation model could be seen as a process akin to social 
construction. But we have to remember that translation is also always a 
misunderstanding. Sites of translation therefore are thus also sites of interpretation 
contention, and re-negotiation. 
 
 
4. ngos from autarky to collaboration 
 
These shifts are harbingers of a new space-time construct. Again, we cannot know the outcome, 
but we can identify the actors involved in the co-evolutionary process. One particularly intriguing 
actor is non-governmental organizations, since for many NGOs the concept of network is closely 
intertwined with their operational logic. This lead to a superficial isomorphism with the perceived 
properties of interactive technology: communication and networking are integral to getting 
information to constituents, channeling and interpreting information from varied sources, 
aggregating information and demands, transmitting them to diverse audiences, and mobilizing 
individuals and groups. As a tool for processing information, interactive technology increased 
NGOs communication and facilitated networking.24 It thus seemed ideal for lowering transaction 
costs, increasing participation and impact, and streamlining operations. The democratic rhetoric 
that accompanied the early years of the Net was also a strong plus—social and organizational 
change could be seen as complementing each other. 
 
It would be an error, however, to see NGOs as having an elective affinity with interactive 
technology, and then to use this a priori affinity to claim that NGOs plus IT equals new 
organizational forms capable of transforming global space if only the forces of friction are 
sufficiently overcome. This, however, is the undertone that pervades much popular discussion 
about NGOs. It is a diffusionist model that presents NGOs as moving under their own inertia. 
                                                     
22 See Arjun Appadurai’s notion of process geographies and trait geographies in Arjun Appadurai, 
"Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imaginaton," Public Culture 12:1 2000. See also Stephen 
Toulmin’s notion of Newtonian image of power exerted with a central force through sovereign agencies in 
Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: the Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1990. 
23 Latour uses the example of rugby players and a rugy ball: “The initial force of the first  in the chain is no 
more important than that of the second, or the fortieth, or of the four hundredth person. Consequently, it is 
clear that the energy cannot be hoarded or capitalized; if you want the token to move on you have to find 
fresh sources of energy all the time; you can never rest on what you did before, no more than rugby players 
can rest for the whole game after the first player has given the ball its first kick.” (original emphasis) 
Powers of Association, 266-67. Latour’s preference for a translation model is that it allows power to be 
seen as a consequence and not a cause of collective action, a point we will return to later. 
24 Increased communication, however, is in itself not a good. Not everything works better with email. See 
Siobhan O’Mahoney and Stephen R Barley, O’Mahony, and. Barley, 1999, “Do Digital 
Telecommunications Affect Work and Organization? The State of Our Knowledge,” Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 21 pp. 125-161. 
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This inertia is connected, often indirectly, to the quasi-mythical view of NGOs from the 1960s 
and 70s as an anti-state and anti-market force. Let us take the example of development NGOs. 
 
As Bishwapriya Sanyal explains, NGOs were privileged in the 70s as “the most appropriate 
catalytic agent for fostering development from below because their organizational priorities and 
procedures are diametrically opposed to those of the institutions at ‘the top.’”25 To fulfill this 
avant garde role NGOs valorized a form of pseudo-autarky for two negative and one positive 
reason: Collaboration with the state was ruled out because it was seen as leading to control or 
cooptation, while collaboration with the market would poison community solidarity bondings. In 
both cases legitimacy and effectiveness were thought to suffer. These were negative reasons for 
maintaining independence. A positive reason was that the principles of self-sufficiency, self-
reliance and social innovation would become the motor for self-reproduction. The basic analytic 
unit was the isolated NGO engaged in a form of autopoesis. There was indeed a self-generating 
quality to this approach, but what it generated was isolation and contradictions. NGOs competed 
fiercely with each other for money and avoided forming institutional linkages with government, 
the commercial sector or even other NGOs. The lack of institutional support doomed all but the 
smallest projects and precluded replication or expansion. When they began to fall apart as a result 
of these incapacities it only intensified competitiveness and isolation and made a mockery of the 
attempt to create a broad base ‘from below’.26 
 
The relative success and high growth of NGOs in the latter part of the ‘80s and especially the ‘90s 
can be attributed not only, or even primarily, to increased externalities, but to the NGOs shift 
from self-imposed isolation to collaboration. NGOs moved to collaboration as they began to 
recognize that success, when it happened, was because they were already engaging in semi-
conscious forms of collaboration that went unacknowledged. For example, NGOs’ own leaders 
were drawn from an elite with informal linkages to all the types of institutions—banks, 
bureaucracies and parties—that form the ‘top.’ Sanyal gives the example of the founders of the 
Grameen Bank, Drs.  Yunus and Latifee, who are mythologized as visionaries whose sole efforts 
resulted in this paradigmatic development from below. They doubtless possessed great vision, 
but, as Sanyal points out, they also had an institutional association with the top university that 
provided both salary and legitimacy, and Yunus’ efforts to convince the bank to make loans was 
not made on the strength of his grassroots organizing ability but because of his family’s long-
standing relationship as a major depositor.27 As the project expanded and became the famous 
Grameen bank, it was on the firm basis of a tripartite alliance between NGOs, government, and 
market institutions.28 
 
The need to be self-sustaining caused conflicts within NGOs because of the siren call of alliances 
with the market as a source of generating independent income, especially as foundations began to 
require better accountability and plans for sustainability. Over the last fifteen years, in the search 
for self-sustainability some NGOs have indeed turned to income generation alternatives that 
mimic commercial enterprises. For example the "dot-corg" dual enterprise model combines social 
and business ventures, separating revenue generation from the NGOs’ social mission and 
evaluating it according to business metrics. There is also a minority of NGOs who, from early on, 
                                                     
25 Bishwapriya Sanyal, Cooperative autonomy: the dialectic of State-NGOs relationship in developing 
countries, Geneva: International Labor Organization, Research Series No.100, 1994, p.37. The following 
depiction is drawn from her excellent account. 
26 Ibid. See also 
27 Ibid., p. 45. 
28 Ibid., see also her similar accounts of the Bangladeshi NGO Proshika, and the Indian NGO SEWA (the 
Self-Employed Women’s Association). 
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set their long-term goal as evolution into a socially-oriented, for-profit venture, such as many 
Internet Service Providers in Eastern Europe who began as non-profits and grew into viable 
businesses.29 When you consider the early resistance of NGOs to allying themselves too closely 
with the market it is striking (or even shocking) to watch recent partnerships emerge such as such 
as the CARE-Starbucks partnership or the  “Libraries Online Partnership” between Microsoft 
Corporation and the non-profit American Library Association.30  
 
Alliances with the market certainly do open new forms of sustainability and even synergy, and 
cannot be dismissed out of hand. If NGOs reject cooperation with state and market forces too 
completely they risk slipping into an exclusively oppositional role with diminished opportunities 
for agenda-setting. Yet this does not mean that old problems of cooptation have disappeared—on 
the contrary, they may even be exacerbated by the new hybrid forms. The values of the market 
and of the non-profit world remain antagonistic. As NGOs spread their accountability unevenly 
among constituents, board members, donors, and the public they find themselves faced with a 
proliferation of performance criteria that catches them between the value systems of business 
(efficiency, solvency) and social mission (adherence to principles, ideological agenda).31 In the 
best case they may exploit these contradictions, but the danger is real that actors who are 
accountable according to many principles become accountable to none.32 
 
Most importantly, success for NGOs came less from developing innovative ideas than from 
basing their efforts “on relatively old ideas which may have been tried, even by the government, 
in another context….Successful NGOs did not pursue only a decentralized approach…their 
success was due to a skilful blending of centralization and decentralization of decisions, 
cooperation and competitiveness….”33 In other words, successful NGOs used logics that are 
distributed and recombinatory. 
 
This shift from pseudo-autarky to collaboration rather than the amassing of successes per se, 
made NGOs increasingly important players at a time when the dominant image of the cold war 
gave way to globalization. We can see how NGOs were able to embody (and thereby help define) 
each of the major shifts we sketched above:  
 
                                                     
29 On both these points see Jonathan Peizer, "Sustainable Development in the Digital Age." 
http://www.mediachannel.org/views/oped/values3.shtml. Accessed  October 15, 2000. 
30 Of course Microsoft and Starbucks were once upon a time anti-establishment upstarts. See Sagawa and 
Segal, 2000. On the CARE/Starbucks alliance see Lindenberg and Bryant, Going Global, especially 
pp. 164-165 and James Austin, The Collaboration Challenge, San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000. On the 
phenomenon of voluntary-commercial cooperation and its attendant challenges see Michael Edwards and 
David Hulme, eds., Too Close for Comfort: NGOs, States and Donors, London: Earthscan Press, 1996, and 
Jem Bendell, Terms of Endearment: Business, NGOs and Sustainable Development, Sheffield UK: 
Greenleaf Publishing, 2000. 
31 Michael Edwards and David Hulme, Beyond the magic bullet : NGO performance and accountability in 
the post cold war world. West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1996. 
32 David Stark, “Ambiguous Assets for Uncertain Environments: Heterarchy in Postsocialist Firms,” in 
Paul DiMaggio, ed., The Twenty-First-Century Firm: Changing Economic Organization in International 
Perspective.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 69-104.  Because the state and market 
themselves are not static but are undergoing fundamental changes an even bigger problem may be 
distinguishing cooperation from co-optation in certain cases. See Bach and Stark, Innovative Ambiguities: 
NGOs use of Interactive Technology in Eastern Europe, Studies in International and Comparative 
Development, Spring 2002. 
33 Sanyal, Cooperative Ambiguity, p.43. See also Kramar 1989. 
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- NGOs were in the forefront in the shift from sovereign sanctity to universal norms, 
particularly in the realms of the environment and human rights. The stunning successes of 
Doctors without Borders and the Campaign to Ban Landmines, both of which won the 
Nobel Peace Prize, gave NGOs publicity and legitimacy that far surpassed previous 
efforts. From a different angle, the anti-WTO protests in Seattle and similar “anti-
globalization” protests from Ottawa to Prague criticized the distributed modes of 
production and called attention to the new forms of connectedness under globalization. In 
an intriguingly isomorphic fashion the protesters, especially the more radical of them, 
also used a distributed logic to achieve their seeming chaotic but well-orchestrated effect: 
the weird coalitions of the anti-globalization movement, as Katharine Viner notes, are 
also wired coalitions.34 
 
- It is not only protesters, however, that use distributed logic, but this can be seen in the 
networks that formed in support of a variety of causes, such as humanitarian relief efforts 
for earthquake and war victims, preserving the Arctic wildlife reservation from oil 
drilling, or pressing for minority rights. This does not mean that competition between, or  
hierarchy within, NGOs has disappeared. But the isolation of NGOs diminishes as 
networks become increasingly standard operating procedure, especially when linked by 
Internet, as most of them are. This allows the leveraging of knowledge across multiple 
logics and ordering principles, creating new opportunities and conundrums, including the 
thorny problem of how to make networks accountable.35 
 
- This leveraging of knowledge through distributed cognition allows NGOs to engage in 
translation as one of their major functions.36 However, as a site of translation is always 
also a misunderstanding it is where negotiations of meaning take place. NGOs occupy a 
particularly strategic position in this regard: they work upwards with governments and 
corporations (e.g. through lobbying, media campaigns, protest and participation in policy 
processes) and downwards with local and marginalized populations(e.g. through in-
country projects, training, re-granting and consciousness-raising). They thus are in a 
position to embody the tension between diffusion and translation that has become, in 
various academic and popular guises, the central debate of postmodernity. 
 
 
5. from knowledge—via associations—to power 
 
The shift from pseudo-autarky to collaboration enabled the structural role of NGOs in 
globalization to become increasingly prominent. This expanded role itself has been enhanced 
through NGOs use of interactive technology within the confines of an information broker model. 
This model is a reasonable and conditioned reaction from the age of mass communication and 
mass production. Modern society is organized along lines of access to quantifiable information 
brokered between those who have information and those who want or need it. It has an hourglass 
                                                     
34 Katharine Viner, "'Luddites' we should not ignore: Instead of vilifying the Prague protesters, we could 
learn from them." The Guardian, Sept. 29, 2000. Thanks to Krista Hegburg for drawing my attention to this 
quote. 
35 Because authority is distributed, accountability becomes highly problematic, especially when thought of 
in the juridical sense of locating responsibility in a figure or specific institution of authority. See Teubner, 
Stark and Bruszt. 
36 See Ulrich Brand, “Non-governmental organizations and post-Fordist politics,” paper presented at the 
International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, February 2001. Compare translation with Fox 
and Brown’s “bridging individuals” in Jonathan Fox and L. David Brown, The Struggle for Accountability: 
The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. 
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structure, with information passing through the broker in the middle on the way from A to B, 
similar to Burt’s bridges across structural holes or Latour’s obligatory passage points.37 This can 
take the ruthless form of a monopolistic corporation or the benevolent form of an NGO seeking to 
spread formerly guarded information. Structurally, however, brokers work in the same way by 
exploiting gaps and, accordingly, gaining rents. They have a vested interest in maintaining the 
gap between information producers and consumers. The affordances of interactive technology can 
be used to maximize this brokering role, along with the power (and perils) that comes with it. 
 
NGOs do not mimic those who ‘hold’ power in principle such as states or rulers (whose claim to 
power can be tautological and often chimerical). But in their enhanced brokering role NGOs do 
gain power Latour’s sense, where power accrues to “those who practically define or redefine 
what ‘holds’ everyone together.”38 Engaging in this practical redefinition enhances NGOs’ power. 
Transnational NGOs are particularly important in this respect. To the extent that NGOs become 
obligatory passage points power can be exerted through the discursive production of the subjects 
they claim to represent, be they aid recipients, organizations to be included in a civil society 
database, or the creation of a regional identity.39 As Paige West documents in her excellent study 
of environmental NGOs in Papua New Guinea, NGOs use their structural and rhetorical power 
“to discursively produce ‘local peoples,’ ‘indigenous peoples,’ ‘peasants’…and have their 
productions taken very seriously.”40 
 
But since translation is always also misunderstanding NGOs do not only produce identities but re-
negotiate them. And since interactive technology affords the ability to shift from information as a 
discrete property to "knowledge" that requires a knowing subject there is more out there than the 
brokerage model. Here we invoke the knowledge space we spoke of earlier, wherein the 
emphases is not information per se but communication and distributed intelligence. Knowledge, 
unlike “information,” cannot exist independently of a subject and cannot be conceived of 
independent of the communication network in which it is both produced and consumed (thus 
blurring the notion itself of producer and consumer). This does not displace or solve the practical 
and epistemological problems occasioned by “information” (e.g. how to process large amounts of 
data, how to insure data protection, how to ascribe meaning to data), but raises different questions 
of an ontological nature. These question the very a priori (diffusionist) assumptions of the 
institutional and organizational forms that order our world. 
 
NGOs themselves transform when shifting their emphasis from brokering information to 
facilitating knowledge. This could make a difference for their potential to be genuinely 
transformative of social structure. As we saw with the IKNOW tool discussed earlier, facilitating 
knowledge is powerful for forming associations that are not just linked communities, but 
knowledge communities that use a recombinant and multiplicative logic of link, search, interact 
to sustain itself and grow. In fact, we can think of NGOs themselves as participating in a high-
stakes, large-scale version of searching for something but not knowing what it is (and only 
possibly recognizing it when they see it!) The impetus for search here is the normative mission of 
NGOs to work for social justice, ameliorate economic inequalities, empower individuals, and 
prevent excessive suffering and death.41 Information itself is of little use here—NGOs that imitate 
                                                     
37 Ronald Burt, Structural Holes, Latour. 
38 Latour, Powers of Association, p.273. 
39 This bears similarities to how non-profits in the US helped construct the categories and stigma of welfare 
recipients. See Barbara Cruikshank, The Will to Empower, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
40 Paige West, “Environmental NGO's and the Nature of Ethnograpic Inquiry,” Social Analysis, 45:2. 
October, 2001, p.29. See also our discussion of meta-NGOs in Bach and Stark, Innovative Ambiguities. 
41 This is, of course, merely a sampling of missions, not a comprehensive list. 
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statistical offices will remain information brokers. Those looking for solutions, however, will use 
search to link and to interact; these NGOs become a social technology where the logic of one is 
refracted through the other.  
 
When NGOs participate at international conferences or liaise with governments or corporate 
boards, they engender deliberative associations that involve negotiations across ordering 
principles and multiple logics.42 As Charles Sabel pointed out in his study of economic 
developmental associations, no state can possibly have the superior knowledge to the economic 
actors or coordinate restructuring better than regional developmental associations—it is the 
associations, not the states, that do the developing.43 Likewise as NGOs become deliberative 
associations they can play a greater role in both development (in the traditional sense) and 
developing global, regional and national structures and institutions. This is because deliberative 
association lead to new associations, both in the literal sense of new networks and the figurative 
sense of a mental connection between ideas. 
 
An example is the now-famous moment during the 1999 anti-WTO protests in Seattle, when, as 
William Greider recounts it, “a squad of activists dressed as sea turtles was marching alongside 
members of the Teamsters union. ‘Turtles love Teamsters,’ the turtles began to chant. ‘Teamsters 
love turtles,’ the truck drivers replied.”44 One associative outcome was the (partial) mental 
morphing of labor unions’ and environmentalists’ respective ideas on the environment and 
economics. Another was the creation of coalitions that turned the “anti-globalization” movement 
that emerged from the protests in Seattle into a community of deliberative associations where the 
lines between environment, economic development and human rights increasingly blurred. A 
much smaller scale example of an associative solution is a Roma Rights organization in Hungary, 
which began solely by trying to link disparate organizations and individuals to each other. As a 
result of the subsequent interaction, the onetime clients moved from being serviced by the 
organization to claiming the organization as their own, eventually becoming involved in the 
governance of the organization. From its origins as an information broker the organization 
transformed into a knowledge community.45 
 
 
6. translation and transformation 
 
The ever-increasing literature on NGOs implicitly recognizes their growing power. NGOs are 
most often discussed, however, as if their form were given and only their effect remains to be 
worked out. Thus we encounter, alternately, NGOs as an incipient global civil society, as 
functional equivalents of democracy, as tools of the ruling class, or as the vanguard for 
globalization from below.46 In nearly all of these scenarios interactive technology appears in a 
                                                     
42 David Stark and László Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East 
Central Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 109-136. 
43 Charles Sabel, “Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy,” in Frank 
Pyke and Werner  Sengenberger, eds., Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration, Geneva: 
International Labor Organization, 1992. 
44 William Greider, "Global Agenda: After the WTO Protest in Seattle, It's Time to Go on the Offensive. 
Here's How," The Nation, Jan. 31, 2000. 
45 See Bach and Stark, “Innovative Ambiguities.” 
46 See among others, Craig Warkentin, Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet and Global Civil 
Society, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001; James N. Rosenau, “Governance and Diplomacy in a 
Globalizing World,” in Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Köhler, eds., Re-imagining Political 
Community, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998; Ulrich Brand, NGOs and Post-Fordist Politics; 
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diffusionist fashion as either speeding up the process, presenting obstacles, or both. Viewing 
technology as an external actant misses the way in which intelligence is distributed across actors 
and artifacts.47 We would like to suggest that before conclusions can be drawn, scholars devote 
more time to studying NGOs and interactive technology as co-evolving actants embedded in an 
era—call it what you like—where knowledge is increasing as a resource for creating enduring 
associations (i.e., as a source of power). This would allow us to trace empirically what we have 
been describing conceptually: As NGOs co-evolve with interactive technology they appear to 
shift from pseudo-autarkic symptoms of an unequal world to collaborative, networked 
communities of deliberative association. 
 
When we employ analytical concepts that bridge the society/technology divide, NGOs appear as a 
molecular technology, a large, self-organizing community of deliberative associations.48 They 
translate (i.e. misunderstand, interpret and re-negotiate) between multiple logics, such as 
indigenous peoples and government bureaucrats. They also translate between an older spatio-
temporal order (the cold war, the sovereign state system, Fordism, etc.) and what we have 
provisionally marked as a knowledge space.49 It would be a mistake to assume this form 
predetermines any a priori normative outcome for NGOs—as we mentioned earlier the problems 
of accountability alone presents substantial challenges to future development. NGOs could quite 
conceivably operate nefariously as the moral instruments of a new global society of control 
precisely because they are networked, molecular structures.50 This shift in form, however, makes 
NGOs axial organizations whose import extends beyond the negotiation of specific issues (e.g. 
carbon dioxide emissions, or landmines) to the re-negotiation of justificatory regimes upon which 
the global temporal-spatial order is based. This, more than any particular event, accounts for 
NGOs growing prominence. NGOs’ use of recombinatory logics allows them to go beyond 
service provision and function as a global navigational tool for exploring a knowledge space full 
of uncertainties and unknowns. The best advice for observers of global transformation is to 
follow that of the old advertisements: watch this space.
                                                                                                                                                              
Richard Falk, Predatory Globalization: A Critique, Malden, MA: Polity Press; Appadurai, Grassroots 
Globalization. 
47 Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild. 
48 See Latour, Technology made Durable. Lévy contrasts molecular with a “molar” technology of human 
groups, where the members “are organized into categories, united by leaders and institutions, managed by a 
bureaucracy or held together by enthusiasm.” Collective Intelligence, p.41. 
49 This space controls what came before, in the sense of paradigm, rather than eliminates it. Lévy gives an 
account of four spaces: earth, territory, commodity and knowledge. See Collective Intelligence. 
50 Or as Hardt and Negri, whose argument this is, put it, they function as “the capillary ends of the 
contemporary networks of power.” Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000, p.313. 
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